NIC VOICE
News Update 04-29-2005
Bulletin: Appeals committee reverses Stroud verdict
Other news of interest across the UMC included in
NIC
VOICE news updates are now being posted in the
NIC VOICE forum at
Faithful Christian Laity Discussion Forum.
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View previously released
NIC
VOICE
news updates on the Beth
Stroud Case here:
http://www.faithfulchristianlaity.org/discussion/viewtopic.php?t=191.
NIC VOICE
news updates published
during the trial week and after have been posted on the
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http://www.nicvoice.org/beth_stroud_trial_updates.htm
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UMNS News Release:
Bulletin: Appeals committee reverses Stroud verdict
An
appeals committee has reversed a clergy court verdict in the case of
Irene Elizabeth “Beth” Stroud. The Northeastern Jurisdiction Committee
on Appeals announced its decision at 10:30 a.m. Eastern time today,
after hearing Stroud’s appeal April 28. Stroud lost her credentials as a
United Methodist minister on Dec. 2 after a clergy trial, which stemmed
from her acknowledgment that she is a practicing lesbian. The
United
Methodist
Church’s
Book of Discipline forbids the ordination and appointment of
“self-avowed practicing homosexuals.” More information on the appeals
committee’s decision will follow this morning.
Update:
The full text of the decision is available as a PDF
document.
COMMITTEE ON APPEALS NORTHEAST JURISDICTIONAL CONFERENCE THE UNITED
METHODIST CHURCH
In re:
Appeal of Irene Elizabeth Stroud
DIGEST OF
CASE
The verdict and the penalty are
reversed and set aside. Although the Committee believes that the
evidence in support of the charge was overwhelming and would be
sustained in the absence of legal error, the Committee’s analysis of two
particular questions of law compels it to conclude that legal error
vitiates the verdict. First, it is the judgment of the Committee on
Appeals that Judicial Council Decision No. 702, which binds this
Committee, makes it legal error to try, convict and deprive a member in
full connection of her right to an appointment pursuant to ¶¶ 304.3 and
2702.1(b) of
The Book of
Discipline of The United Methodist Church1
when, as in this case, neither
the General Conference nor the pertinent Annual Conference has defined
the words “practicing homosexual” and “status.” Second, legal error was
committed by trying and convicting Appellant on the basis of ¶ 304.3
because that provision constitutes a “new standard or rule of doctrine”
which has not been declared by the General Conference to be “‘not
contrary to’ the present standards,” in violation of the First
Restrictive Rule and ¶ 102 of the
Discipline.
STATEMENT OF
FACTS
Irene Elizabeth Stroud
(“Appellant”) was ordained as an Elder in the Eastern Pennsylvania
Annual Conference in 1997. After serving for two years as Associate
Pastor at West Chester United Methodist Church, she was appointed in
July 1999 as Associate Pastor at First United Methodist Church of
Germantown (Pa.) (“FUMCOG”).
Appellant’s
Disclosures to Her Bishop and Congregation
In
March 2003, Appellant met with her then Bishop (Peter Weaver, now the
Resident Bishop of the Boston Area) and disclosed “that she was a
lesbian living in a committed relationship with a partner.”
Trial
Transcript
(“Tr.”) at 51. Appellant
explained to Bishop Weaver that she was making this disclosure
voluntarily because “she was yearning to be truthful and honest and live
out her integrity as both a Christian as well as a human being . . . .”
Id.
In a letter dated April 19, 2003, Appellant “notified the members of [FUMCOG]
of her struggle ‘to respond to God’s calling’ while ‘a lesbian living in
a committed relationship with a
1
All
references in this decision to the
Discipline
are to the
2000 version, which is controlling in this case, for both substantive
and procedural purposes, given the period during which the relevant
conduct occurred and the date the Bill of Charges and Specifications was
received.
1
WAS:112156.2
partner.’”
Judicial
Complaint
(“Complaint”),
¶ 1.2
Appellant’s letter reiterated
her desire to be “more fully open about my sexual orientation and my
family life with my partner,” and acknowledged that doing so “will put
my credentials as an ordained United Methodist minister at risk.”
Id.,
¶ 2. On April 27, 2003, Appellant delivered a sermon at FUMCOG,
disclosing in that forum that she was a lesbian and introducing the
partner with whom she had lived “in a covenant relationship for two and
one-half years.”
Id.,
¶¶ 8-9.
Initiation
of the Complaint Process
In a letter dated May 29, 2003,
Bishop Weaver notified Appellant that, as a result of her disclosures,
he was initiating the complaint process, pursuant to ¶ 359 of the
Discipline,
to “bring [her] membership in the ministerial office of Elder under
review.”
Complaint,
¶ 11 & Exhibit C thereto. Bishop Weaver’s letter indicated that she
would be charged with engaging in “practices declared by The United
Methodist Church to be incompatible with Christian teachings,” which is
a chargeable offense under ¶ 2702.1(b) of the
Discipline.
Thereafter, a supervisory response was pursued pursuant to ¶ 359.1(b) of
the
Discipline,
but reconciliation was not achieved.
Complaint,
¶¶ 12-13. Accordingly, on March 31, 2004, a Judicial Complaint was filed
on behalf of the Eastern Pennsylvania Annual Conference against
Appellant. The Complaint asked the conference’s Committee on
Investigation to “determine whether reasonable grounds exist to bring a
bill of charges and specifications to trial.”
Id.
at 3. Appellant answered the Complaint on June 14, 2004, admitting the
basic factual allegations set forth in ¶¶ 1-15 of the Complaint, but
denying the “legal conclusion” in ¶ 16 of the Complaint, which had
alleged that “the matter must be sent to trial under Par. 2702.1(b)” of
the
Discipline
“if the Committee on
Investigation also finds reasonable evidence that this ordained minister
is a ‘practicing lesbian’ . . . .”
See Answer,
¶¶ 1-2;
Complaint,
¶ 16.
Bill of
Charges and Specifications
A Bill of Charges and
Specifications was first issued by the Committee on Investigation for
the Eastern Pennsylvania Annual Conference on July 26, 2004. That bill
charged Appellant with violating ¶ 2702.1(b) of the
Discipline
“by engaging in practices
declared by The United Methodist Church to be incompatible with
Christian teachings.” In September 2004, however, this charge was
declared null and void by the Presiding Officer, Bishop Joseph Yeakel,
for two reasons. First, Bishop Yeakel ruled that Committee on
Investigation’s vote was invalid because two laypersons had voted and,
when those votes were excluded, as the Discipline required, there would
be insufficient votes to constitute a quorum. Second, relying on
Judicial Council Decision No. 980, Bishop Yeakel ruled that members of
the Committee on Investigation should have been polled in advance to
determine if any of them were unwilling to uphold the
Discipline
for reasons of conscience or
otherwise and, if so, any such members must “step aside in this matter
and either alternate members or others who are willing to uphold the
Discipline must be appointed to the Committee to enable it to complete
its responsibility.”
Decision
No. 980.
Accordingly, Bishop Yeakel remanded the matter to the Committee on
Investigation for a rehearing.
2
In her
Answer to the Complaint, dated June 14, 2004, Appellant admitted the
facts alleged in the first 15 paragraphs of the Judicial Complaint, from
which most of this Statement of Facts is drawn.
2
WAS:112156.2
After
reconvening, a quorum of seven members of the Committee on Investigation
voted unanimously to bring a second Bill of Charges and Specifications
against Appellant, which was issued on October 11, 2004. The sole charge
asserted was that Appellant “has violated paragraph 2702(1)(b) of
The 2000
Discipline
by “engaging in practices
declared by The United Methodist Church
to be
incompatible with Christian teachings.”
Bill of
Charges and Specifications
at 1 (emphasis in original).
The Committee alleged that this charge was supported by five
specifications, which may be summarized as follows: 1. Appellant’s
disclosures in her April 19, 2003 letter to FUMCOG, including the
disclosure that she was “a lesbian living in a committed relationship
with a partner,” and that she understood that “being more fully open
about my sexual orientation and family life with my partner will put my
credentials as an ordained United Methodist minister at risk.”
Id.,
Specification No. 1. 2. Appellant’s April 27, 2003 sermon at FUMCOG,
including her public disclosure there that she was a lesbian and had
“lived in a covenant relationship [with her partner] for two and
one-half years.”
Id.,
Specification No. 2. 3. A transcript of the Committee on Investigation’s
interview of Appellant on July 23, 2004, during which (a) the Committee
had asked whether the relationship between Appellant and her female
partner “is a complete physical one and whether or not you have or are
engaged in genital sexual contact,” and (b) Appellant had responded,
“yes, that is a part of our relationship. It’s a part of who we are as a
loving couple and as partners.”
Id.,
Specification No. 3. 4. An ultimate allegation that the Committee
believes and avers that Ms. Stroud is currently, and for approximately
3˝ years has been, a self-avowed practicing homosexual in a monogamous,
committed relationship with a specific female partner while in the
ordained ministry of The United Methodist Church. As a part of the
totality of that relationship, Ms. Stroud and her partner have expressed
themselves physically and sexually, including genital sexual acts.
Constituting
the Trial Court
On October 18, 2004, the Dean
of the cabinet sent a letter to 66 clergy members who had been nominated
by the cabinet to serve as the pool from which the Trial Court would be
drawn. The letter included four questions that Bishop Yeakel, as the
Presiding Officer, required the nominees to answer to assess their
eligibility to serve on the Trial Court. The first three questions asked
(1) whether they were members in full connection in the Eastern
Pennsylvania Annual Conference; (2) whether they had been a member of
any conference organization that had previously been involved in the
proceedings against Appellant; and (3) whether they had already
predetermined Appellant’s guilt or innocence. The fourth question, which
the Presiding
3
WAS:112156.2
Officer
indicated was prompted by Judicial Council Decision No. 980,3
asked the following of the
nominees for the Trial Court pool: Are you willing and able to abide by
the provisions of the
2000 Book
of Discipline of The United Methodist Church,
setting aside your own opinions and feelings, and find the respondent
(Pastor Stroud) guilty, if there is clear and convincing evidence to
sustain the charge? According to the transcript of Bishop Yeakel’s
pretrial rulings, 14 nominees were excused because, in response to the
questionnaire, they had “indicated either they had already pre-decided
the guilt or innocence of the Respondent [the focus of the third
question] or they were unwilling to set aside their own convictions and
administer the Discipline as stated by the Judicial Council” [the focus
of the fourth question].
Tr.
at 5. Another nominee was excused because a physical disability hampered
his ability to serve, and two more were excused after they came down
with the flu on the eve of trial.
Id.
In the end, then, the Trial Court was drawn from a pool of 49, rather
than 66, members in full connection.
Id.
at 5-6.
Pre-Trial
Rulings
Before the trial commenced, the
Presiding Officer made two rulings of law that have been challenged on
appeal. First, Bishop Yeakel overruled Appellant’s objection to the
fourth question presented to the nominees for the Trial Court pool.
Understanding that Bishop Yeakel had posed the question based on
Decision No. 980, Appellant argued (a) that Decision No. 980 was
inapplicable because the composition of the Trial Court was not properly
before the Judicial Council in that case; and (b) that including the
question had the effect of depriving Appellant of a trial by a jury that
was truly representative of her peers. On December 1, 2004, the day the
trial commenced, Bishop Yeakel explained his reason for overruling
Appellant’s objection as follows: In light of the ruling of the Judicial
Council in terms of stepping aside and in light of the Discipline
statement of innocence must be presumed until the time of the decision
of the Court, I’m denying the appeal for the expansion of the Trial
Court to its original size or its original named persons and indicating
that we will work with the 49 available to us today. (Tr. at 6) Also on
December 1, 2004, Bishop Yeakel affirmed a request by Church Counsel to
preclude Appellant from presenting argument or testimony at trial to the
effect that pursuing a charge predicated on ¶ 304.3 of the
Discipline
violated other provisions of
the
Discipline,
including various provisions of the denomination’s Constitution, as well
as Judicial Council Decision No. 702.
See
generally Tr.
at 17-19. Appellant’s counsel
argued, and proffered
3
In Decision
No. 980, the Judicial Council indicated that, just as members of a
Committee on Investigation who are “unwilling to uphold the Discipline
for reasons of conscience or otherwise . . . must step aside,” so that
“either alternate members or others who are willing to uphold the
Discipline” may “complete [the Committee’s] responsibility,” so, too,
“once a bill of charges is certified, persons who state that they cannot
in good conscience uphold the
Discipline
are
ineligible to serve on a trial jury.”
4
WAS:112156.2
testimony to
support arguments, that pursuing a charge based on the statement in ¶
304.3 that the “practice of homosexuality is incompatible with Christian
teachings” (1) violates her fair process rights under the Constitution
and Judicial Council Decision No. 702, inasmuch as neither the General
Conference nor the Eastern Pennsylvania Annual Conference has defined
the words “practicing homosexual” or “status”; (2) violates the
Constitution’s proscription against discrimination on the basis of
“status,” as expressed in ¶¶ 4 and 15 of the
Discipline;
and (3) violates the Constitution insofar as ¶ 304.3 violates the First
and Fifth Restrictive Rules, as expressed in ¶¶ 16 and 19 of the
Discipline,
which seek to preserve our historical Articles of Religion, General
Rules and doctrinal standards.
See
generally Tr.
at 8-14. The Church’s counsel
responded that all of these arguments—and any testimony proffered to
support them—were irrelevant to, and beyond the proper scope of, the
trial proceedings. In essence, Church Counsel argued that, while the
issues that Appellant sought to raise “may be appropriate legislative
consideration by the General Conference, they are . . . not relevant to
the issue of this trial,”
Tr.
at 16, which is simply “to
determine whether or not the rule of law itself has been transgressed.”
Tr.
at 17. Bishop Yeakel
“affirm[ed] the petition of the Church that the question of
constitutionality and the decisions of the Judicial Council being raised
are not relevant to this particular case and that we will proceed
without reference to the issue of constitutionality in the trial without
witness or argument from this time forward.”
Tr.
at 19. Bishop Yeakel explained
that an “ambiguity” in Judicial Council Decision No. 702—the decision
upon which Appellant relied to support some of her arguments–was
“finally clarified for the General Conference” in the Judicial Council’s
subsequent ruling in Decision No. 984, which clearly held that ¶ 304.3
constitutes “a declaration of the General Conference of the United
Methodist Church that . . . the practice of homosexuality is
incompatible with Christian teachings.”
Tr.
at 18-19.
Trial:
Verdict & Penalty
After Bishop Yeakel confirmed
his pre-trial rulings on the record, the trial commenced on December 1,
2004. The Church’s evidence consisted of testimony from Bishop Weaver
and Appellant herself. Testimony in support of Appellant’s position was
presented on the morning of December 2, 2004, by Bishop John Schol and
the Rev. Alfred Day. After all testimony was concluded, counsel for the
Church and Appellant presented closing statements, after which Bishop
Yeakel instructed on the Trial Court on the law that should guide their
deliberations in determining Appellant’s guilt or innocence of the
charge.
Tr.
at 146-154. On the afternoon of
December 2, the Trial Court returned with a verdict of guilty on all
four specifications and the charge. Twelve members of the Trial Court
voted guilty on all four specifications and the charge. One member voted
not guilty.
Tr.
at 159-160. The trial then turned to the penalty phase, which began with
counsel for both parties presenting argument to the Trial Court on what
each believed was an appropriate sanction. The focus of Church Counsel’s
argument was that the Judicial Council’s ruling in Decision No.
985—confirming that “a bishop may not appoint one who has been found by
a trial court to be a self-avowed, practicing homosexual”—means “that
the only penalty possible is to revoke the credentials of ordination of
Reverend Stroud.”
Tr.
at 161. Counsel for Appellant
then argued that, under the
Discipline,
the Trial Court had discretion to impose “a lesser penalty,” and urged
5
WAS:112156.2
the Trial
Court to do so, bearing in mind, among other things, that “Beth Stroud
is a person of integrity and that’s why she could no longer remain
silent about her gift of sexuality, though to have been silent would
have certainly been prudent.”
Tr.
at 162-63. Promptly after counsel concluded their statements regarding
the penalty issue, Bishop Yeakel provided instructions to the Trial
Court to govern its deliberations in selecting a penalty. Bishop Yeakel
stated: Let me turn to the Trial Court. It is true that the decision of
the Judicial Council No. 985 indicates that a Bishop may not appoint one
who has been found by a Trial Court to be a self-avowed practicing
homosexual. The Discipline further states that the Trial Court shall
determine the penalty which shall require a vote of at least 7 members.
It’s 9 for verdict and 7 for penalty. The Trial Court shall have the
power to expel the Respondent from the Church, terminate the conference
membership and/or revoke the credentials of ordination or consecration
of Respondent, suspend the Respondent from the exercise of the functions
of office, or to fix a lesser penalty. There are no further
clarifications than the information I’ve shared with you. (Tr.
at 164-65.) After receiving
these instructions,4
the Trial Court withdrew to
deliberate. Later that afternoon, the Trial Court returned and announced
that, by a vote of seven to six, the Trial Court had decided to impose
as a penalty “the withdrawal of the credentials of ordination or
consecration of the Respondent.”
Tr.
at 166. Appellant timely filed this appeal.
4
Church
Counsel’s brief represents that the Trial Court, after withdrawing to
deliberate on the penalty, requested further clarification regarding its
discretion in establishing a penalty, and that the Presiding Officer
responded by providing further instructions, with counsel for both sides
present. Since there is no transcript or other formal record of any such
further instructions, however, the Committee on Appeals may not base its
decision in this appeal on any such further instructions.
See Discipline,
¶ 2710.8 (“A verbatim record of all proceedings of the trial shall be by
stenograph or other appropriate means and reduced to writing and
certified by the presiding officer or secretary. The record, including
all exhibits, papers and evidence in the case, shall be the basis of any
appeal that may be taken.”);
Id.,
¶ 2715.6 (“The records and documents of the trial, including the
evidence, and these only, shall be used in the hearing of any appeal.”);
Id.,
¶ 2715.7 (Appeal “shall be determined by the records of the trial and
the argument of counsel for the Church and for the respondent. The
appellate body shall in no case hear witnesses.”).
6
WAS:112156.2
JURISDICTION
The Committee on Appeals has
jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to the
Discipline,
¶¶ 2715-2716.
ANALYSIS AND
RATIONALE
The Committee is charged by the
Discipline
“to determine two questions
only: (a) Does the weight of the evidence sustain the charge or charges?
(b) Were there such errors of Church law as to vitiate the verdict
and/or the penalty?”
Discipline,
¶ 2715.7. In making that determination, the Committee is obliged to
adhere to the
Discipline,
as interpreted by the Judicial Council, and to any holdings of the
Judicial Council that are relevant to the issues presented by the
parties.
A. Does the
Weight of the Evidence Sustain the Charge?
Although the Appellant’s fourth argument on appeal is framed in terms of
a challenge to the “weight of the evidence,” she is
not
challenging the sufficiency of
the evidence that was presented to the Trial Court. Rather, Appellant’s
argument is essentially that the Presiding Officer improperly
excluded
evidence, and that if “this
information [had] been available to the Trial Court, there would not
have been sufficient basis for the verdict and penalty reached in the
trial.” Appellant’s Br. at 42. In our judgment, this is an assertion of
legal error by the Presiding Officer, not a challenge to the Trial
Court’s weighing of the evidence with which they were presented. In the
Committee’s judgment, there is no credible basis for concluding that the
evidence that
was
presented to the Trial Court
was insufficient based on the instructions the Trial Court was given.
Indeed, the evidence was uncontradicted and overwhelming—based as it was
on Appellant’s own admissions—that Appellant had engaged in genital
sexual activity in the context of a longstanding committed relationship
with a partner of the same gender. To the extent such conduct
constitutes the “practice of homosexuality” as defined by the law of the
Church, then there is no question that the weight of the evidence
sustained the charge. The only conceivably open questions, in our
judgment, are: (1) whether the charge has been adequately defined by the
Church; and (2) whether the charge is invalid on the asserted ground
that it conflicts with the Church’s Constitution. Appellant’s
presentation on those questions constitutes the assertion of legal
errors and must be addressed as such, rather than as challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence.
B. Were
There Such Errors Of Church Law As To Vitiate The Verdict And/Or The
Penalty? 1. Did the Questionnaire Given to the Pool From Which The Trial
Court Was Selected Violate Due Process?
Appellant’s first assignment of legal error is that she was denied fair
process as a consequence of the Presiding Officer’s having asked the
Trial Court pool whether they were “willing and able to abide by the
provisions of the
2000 Book
Of Discipline Of The United Methodist Church,
setting aside your own opinions and feelings, and find the Respondent .
. . guilty, if there is clear and convincing evidence to sustain the
charge?” Appellant argues that the
7
WAS:112156.2
ruling in
Decision No. 980 that “persons who state that they cannot in good
conscience uphold the Discipline are ineligible to serve on a trial
jury” exceeded the Judicial Council’s authority because the composition
of the jury pool was not yet at issue in the
Dammann
case, no charges having been
certified at the time Decision No. 980 was rendered. Appellant’s Br. at
17-18. Appellant further argues that, even if it was appropriate to
inquire into the pool member’s willingness to uphold the
Discipline,
“the actual wording of the question denied Pastor Stroud a fair trial
court because it was biased against her” and had the effect of depriving
her of a “representative” jury.
Id.
at 18-19. The Committee holds that the Presiding Officer’s inquiries to
the jury pool do not constitute an error of Church law that vitiates the
verdict or the penalty. First, even if the composition of the jury pool
was not yet at issue in Decision No. 980, it is not clear to us that it
would make the Judicial Council’s ruling on that point any less binding
on the Presiding Officer or the Committee. More importantly, even if
Appellant is correct on that point, the question would remain whether it
was error for Bishop Yeakel to ask panel members whether any
conscientious objection to the
Discipline
would preclude them from
rendering a finding a guilt if the charges were proved by clear and
convincing evidence. We believe that it was not error to pose such a
question. The question to which Appellant objects is consistent with the
need to ensure that all church trials—regardless of the issue—are
decided solely on the basis of the evidence and the law. The viability
of our rules, as well as the rights of those accused of violating those
rules, depends on ensuring that the Trial Court is composed of persons
who will decide guilt or innocence on the basis of the evidence
presented and the legal instructions they are given, not on the basis of
whether they personally approve or disapprove of our rules.
See
Judicial Council Decision No. 886.
The
question is also consistent with the Judicial Council’s admonitions—in
decisions besides Decision No. 980—that Annual Conferences and their
subsidiary units—which include Trial Courts—may not implement their
duties in such a way as to nullify any portion of the
Discipline.
Id.
With respect to the argument that the question displayed a bias in favor
of conviction, we are not persuaded that the wording or structure of the
question prejudiced the Appellant or resulted in an “unrepresentative”
jury. Guilt was not presupposed; rather, the Presiding Officer asked
whether, “if
there is
clear and convincing evidence to sustain the charge,”
pool members would be able to set aside their personal feelings and find
the respondent guilty. It is true that the Presiding Officer might have
also asked, “If the evidence does not clearly and convincingly sustain
the charge, are you willing and able to abide by the
Discipline
and render a verdict of not
guilty, setting aside your own opinions and feelings?” He did, however,
pose another question designed to ensure that no one had prejudged
Appellant’s guilt of the charge, and we are persuaded, taken as a whole,
the questions posed were not biased against Appellant but were designed
to guard against a jury that had prejudged the case, one way or the
other. Finally, it is impossible to determine from the record how many
potential jurors were excluded based on their answers to the question to
which Appellant objects. Under those circumstances, we are unable to
conclude that any of the 13 members that ultimately comprised the Trial
Court were not “representative” or had prejudged the case.
8
WAS:112156.2
2. Did the Presiding Officer Commit Legal Error by Excluding Argument
and Evidence to Support Appellant’s Contention That The Charges Violated
the Constitution, the Articles of Religion and the General Rules
In our view, Appellant’s
argument that Bishop Yeakel erred by excluding argument or testimony at
trial breaks down into two questions: (1) Was it error to exclude
testimony
to the
Trial Court
to the effect that pursuing a
charge predicated on ¶ 304.3 of the
Discipline
violated other provisions of
the
Discipline?
(2) Was it error to rule those legal challenges out of order even to the
extent they were presented as legal
argument?
For the reasons explained below, we hold that it was not error to
exclude testimony on these points, but that Appellant’s legal arguments
were not beyond the proper scope of these proceedings and, in two narrow
respects, must be resolved in Appellant’s favor based on the plain terms
of the
Discipline
and binding Judicial Council
decisions.
a.
Appellant’s Legal Challenges Were Not Within the Trial Court’s Purview,
But Were Properly Raised As Legal Argument and Should Have Been Resolved
by the Presiding Officer
Insofar as Appellant sought to
assert her legal arguments in the form of testimony for resolution by
the Trial Court, such evidence was rightly excluded. Under our system of
judicial process, the Trial Court is not empowered to decide issues of
law; its sole function, like that of a jury in a secular court, is to
determine whether the
facts,
as demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence, sustain the charge. In
making that determination, the Trial Court must accept the Presiding
Officer’s instructions on the governing
law
as a given; it has no authority
to declare Church law invalid or unconstitutional and each of its
members is duty-bound to decide guilt or innocence in accordance with
the legal instructions given by the Presiding Officer. This conclusion
is required by the express terms of ¶¶ 2710 and 2711 of the
Discipline,
which distinguishes the authority and power of the Presiding Officer and
the Trial Court, respectively, making clear that the Trial Court’s
function is to make a disposition of the charge—guilty or innocent—based
on instructions of Church law supplied by the Presiding Officer.
Discipline,
¶¶ 2710.1, 2710.10 & 2711. By the same token, however, the
Presiding
Officer,
as distinct from the Trial Court,
is
authorized to make rulings of
law, including on constitutional issues, during the trial process. That
questions of law may be decided by the Presiding Officer is contemplated
by ¶ 2715.9, which provides that, although “the right to present
evidence shall be exhausted when the case has been heard once on its
merits in the proper court, . . .
questions
of Church law may be carried on appeal, step by step, to the Judicial
Council."
Discipline,
¶ 2715.9 (emphasis added). It goes without saying that questions of
Church law cannot be “carried on appeal, step by step,” if they cannot
be presented in the first instance during the trial proceedings. The
Discipline
also provides that the
Presiding Officer’s role is analogous to that of a judge in a secular
jury trial, expressly giving the Presiding Officer, in addition to
specifically enumerated powers, “such other authority as is normally
vested in a civil court judge sitting with a jury.” ¶ 2710.1. We also
conclude that this authority includes the power to resolve
constitutional issues. First, the authority given by the General
Conference in ¶ 2715.9 expressly extends to “questions of Church law,”
without indicating any exception for questions of constitutional law.
Second, 9
WAS:112156.2
judges in
analogous secular courts clearly have the power and duty to resolve
constitutional challenges.
Marbury v.
Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-78 (1803);
Robb v.
Conolly,
111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884);
Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 31-42 (1816) (Story, J.). Third, to hold that
the Presiding Officer has no authority to entertain Constitutional
challenges—that the Judicial Council is the only body that can do so,
and only then upon a petition for a declaratory decision from one of the
limited class of institutions eligible to seek such declarations—is
effectively to preclude anyone charged in a trial proceeding from
raising due process or other constitutional challenges. Indeed, if the
rule is that constitutional challenges can only be raised in a petition
for a declaratory decision, then not even the Judicial Council can could
entertain the constitutional challenges advanced in this appeal of a
trial court verdict. Such a holding would be anomalous, given the
Constitution’s dominant focus on protecting the rights of the accused
and the Judicial Council’s admonition that legislation which exceeds the
limits of the Constitution is void and unenforceable.
Judicial
Council Decision No. 819.
Finally, it is, of course, true—as Appellant’s counsel concedes—that the
Judicial Council upheld ¶ 304.3 against a constitutional challenge in
Decision No. 544. The question, though, is whether the Judicial Council,
in Decision No. 544 or any other Judicial Council decision, has resolved
the
particular
constitutional challenges
raised here
by
Appellant.
If so, and if those decisions were adverse to Appellant’s position, the
Presiding Officer and the Committee would have no choice but to reject
those arguments. The grounds for doing so, however, would be that the
arguments lacked merit as a matter of binding law, not that they were
irrelevant or beyond the purview of these proceedings altogether. In
sum, Appellant was properly precluded from presenting her legal
challenges in the form of evidence for resolution by the Trial Court,
which properly sits only as a jury. On the other hand, it was error to
preclude Appellant from presenting legal argument on those points on the
ground that they were irrelevant or beyond the scope of these
proceedings. In the following sections, we analyze the merits of the
particular legal challenges, in order to determine whether the exclusion
of any of those arguments is sufficient to vitiate the verdict and/or
penalty.
b. Judicial
Council Decision No. 702 Requires That The Verdict And Penalty Be Set
Aside Because Neither The General Conference Nor The Eastern
Pennsylvania Annual Conference Has Defined The Words “Practicing
Homosexual” And “Status”
The first of Appellant’s legal
challenges is a due process challenge, which is predicated primarily on
Judicial Council Decision 702. In that case, building upon its ruling in
Decision No. 544, the Judicial Council held that the “Annual Conference
must make any determination which would effect a change in ministerial
standing,” and that “[t]he
prohibition of an appointment
[based on the provision that now appears as ¶ 304.3] must be exercised
in compliance with the rights of all persons who are in full
membership.”
Decision
No. 702.
The Judicial Council then further held that, “[I]In order to do
that”—that is, in order to ensure that “the prohibition of an
appointment . . . is exercised in compliance with the rights of all
persons who are in full membership”—“the “words ‘status’ and
‘self-avowed practicing homosexual’ must be defined by either the
General Conference or the various Annual Conferences.”
10
WAS:112156.2
Appellant
argues that this holding is violated in her case—and, therefore, her due
process rights have been violated—because neither the General
Conference, nor her Annual Conference, has ever defined by either
“practicing homosexual” or “status.” This is not a frontal challenge to
the constitutionality of ¶ 304.3 Rather, it is an argument that,
according to Decision No. 702, due process is not satisfied if ¶ 304.3
is used to prohibit Appellant’s appointability without first receiving a
definition of both “practicing homosexual” and “status” from the General
Conference or the Annual Conference. Appellant is correct that neither
of these phrases has been defined by the General Conference or the
Eastern Pennsylvania Annual Conference. There is nothing in the record
that suggests that the Annual Conference has done so. Moreover, although
the General Conference has now defined “self-avowed” in a footnote to ¶
304.3, that footnote merely repeats, without adding any content, the
words “practicing homosexual.” Nor has the General Conference defined
“status,” notwithstanding that in Decision No. 845 the Judicial Council
again strongly urged the General Conference to do so with respect to
sexual orientation in particular. We recognize that Judicial Council
Decisions Nos. 920 and 980 indicate that “practicing homosexual” may
encompass engaging in “genital sexual activity,” but we cannot conclude
that either of those decisions relieve this Committee from the binding
holding in Decision No. 702, which built on Decision No. 544, that (a)
“prohibition of an appointment”—which is clearly at stake in this
case—“must be exercised in compliance with the rights of all persons who
are in full membership,” and (b) “[i]n order to do that, the words
‘status’ and ‘self-avowed practicing homosexual’
must
be defined by either the
General Conference or the various Annual Conferences.” In the first
place, Decisions Nos. 920 and 980 provide nothing at all in terms of a
definition of “status.” Moreover, the reference to engaging in “genital
sexual activity” in Decisions Nos. 920 and 980 was not supplied for
purposes of
trial
with the result that a clergy
member’s right to an appointment was finally prohibited, but for
purposes of the beginning stages of reviewing the accused’s relations
with the conference. The core holding in Decision No. 920 was that a
“statement by a clergy woman that she is ‘living in a partnered,
covenanted homosexual relationship with another woman’ is sufficient . .
. to subject such person’s membership in her ministerial office to
review
under ¶ 359.1 of the
Discipline.”
Similarly, the key holding in Decision No. 980 was that a Committee on
Investigation must
certify
charges
that a clergy member has
violated ¶ 2702.1.b when the member has admitted living in a homosexual
relationship that includes “genital sexual contact.” In essence, then,
Decisions 920 and 980 provide a working definition of “practicing
homosexual” that illuminates the circumstances in which the review and
charging process
must be put
in motion
so that matter can be placed
firmly in the hands of the Annual Conference. We do not find anything in
those decisions that persuades us that, once the process is initiated,
the Annual Conference is relieved of its duty under Decision No. 702 to
protect the due process rights of one of its members by defining the
conduct upon which her appointment stands to be prohibited and by
defining “status” so that judicial officers can meaningfully decide her
challenge that the legislation violates the constitutional proscription
against discrimination on the basis of status. Any conclusion that the
holding of Decision No. 702 has been supplanted by Decisions 920 and 980
is also undermined by the fact that the definition suggested in latter
decisions is too
11
WAS:112156.2
narrow to be
workable across the board in all cases. The definition provided in those
cases is, in fact, gender-specific, addressing only women clergy. Nor do
we find anything in decisions that post-date Decision No. 702 that
indicates that the Judicial Council has retracted its view that “[i]t is
not the task of the Judicial Council to legislate the meaning of words
passed by the General Conference,” and that, certainly where matters of
conference relations and appointment rights are at stake, it is “clear
that either the General Conference or the Annual Conferences must define
for their own use, the words ‘self-avowed practicing homosexual.’” Of
course, it is also not responsive to this assignment of due process
error to say that the argument was foreclosed by the Judicial Council’s
holding in Decision No. 544. The constitutional challenge at issue in
Decision No. 544 was distinct from the due process challenge addressed
here. Indeed, inasmuch as the due process holding in Decision No. 702
was predicated largely on the analysis in Decision No. 544, the two
decisions are congruent. In short, we conclude that Decisions Nos. 920
and 980 do not constitute an about-face for the Judicial Council, but
should be understood as illuminating the circumstances in which the
review process must be initiated, so that the Annual Conference can
perform its duty of deciding all matters relating to membership status,
while remaining true to the Judicial Council’s longstanding
pronouncements on what is necessary to ensure compliance with due
process. If the Judicial Council had intended in Decisions 920 or 980 to
retract its holdings in Decisions No. 544 and 702—and to henceforth
dispense with the longstanding practice of reviewing the legality of
annual conference definitions developed in response to the Judicial
Council’s admonitions—the Judicial Council would have said so directly.
See, e.g.,
Decisions Nos. 722, 725, 764,
837 (all ruling on legality of various Annual Conference definitions of
“self-avowed practicing homosexual”). The Committee stresses that its
decision on this point says
nothing
about the wisdom or theological
soundness of ¶ 304.3. The Committee recognizes and respects that the
General Conference is the supreme lawmaking body of the Church and that
all are bound to live by, and may not legitimately act to nullify, that
law. The Committee also appreciates that its decision may frustrate the
will expressed by a majority at several General Conferences. On this
issue, however, that frustration is a product of the fact that the
Committee is obliged to follow the rulings of the Judicial Council when
applying the
Discipline.
The Committee’s narrow holding is simply that binding Judicial Council
precedent continues to require that ¶ 304.3 cannot constitutionally be
applied to prohibit an appointment unless either the General Conference
or the Annual Conference has first defined both “practicing homosexual”
and “status.” Since neither phrase has been defined by either of the
requisite bodies in this case, the verdict and penalty must be set
aside.
c. The
Verdict And Penalty Be Set Aside Because ¶ 304.3 violates the First
Restrictive Rule
We also conclude that ¶ 304.3
violates the First Restrictive Rule, an argument raised at pp. 21-22 of
Appellant’s brief. Since this argument has not previously been addressed
by the Judicial Council, it, too, is not foreclosed by prior Judicial
Council precedent.
12
WAS:112156.2
The First
Restrictive Rule provides that the “General Conference shall not revoke,
alter or change our Articles of Religion or establish any new standards
or rules of doctrine contrary to our present existing and established
standards of doctrine.”
Discipline,
¶ 16. With respect to the latter part of this restriction, the
Discipline
further makes clear no “new
standards or rules of doctrine” are valid unless either (a) it has been
“declared
‘not contrary to’ the present
standards,” or (b) has gone “through the difficult process of
constitutional amendment.”
Discipline,
¶ 102, p. 58. In construing these provisions, the Judicial Council has
held that it is not competent to make a determination on whether a new
rule or standard of doctrine is congruent with or contrary to existing
rules and standards. Decision No. 358. Thus, in falls to the General
Conference alone to issue the declaration, required by ¶ 102, that any
new doctrinal standard or rule, is not contrary to present standards.
The Committee concludes that ¶ 304.3 constitutes a new standard or rule
of doctrine within the meaning of the First Restrictive Rule because it
establishes a definitive interpretation of “Christian teaching” on a
particular subject and binds the Church to act in accordance with that
interpretation. While there is nothing to prevent the Church from
establishing rules and standards for ministry, ¶ 304.3 goes beyond the
mere articulation of a rule or qualification for ministry. It declares
that the church is compelled by a particular theological understanding.
It seeks to define the Christian position on the practice of
homosexuality, and thus enters into the realm of doctrine. Yet, there is
no record that, in enacting ¶ 304.3, the General Conference has ever
issued a declaration that the new rule is congruent with prior rules and
standards of doctrine. Nor was “the difficult process of constitutional
amendment” (¶ 102) used to adopt ¶ 304.3. Under these circumstances, the
enactment of ¶ 304.3 did not satisfy the dictates set down by the
General Conference, therefore, is null and void. This holding, too,
makes no judgment on the content of ¶ 304.3. In this instance, our
holding is strictly that the Discipline requires that one of two
procedures be followed before a new doctrinal standard can have effect,
and neither was done with respect to ¶ 304.3. For that reason, the
verdict and penalty, which depend on the validity of ¶ 304.3, must be
set aside.
3.
Appellant’s Remaining Legal Arguments
Appellant has advanced a number of other legal arguments, which the
Committee addresses briefly as follows:
A.
Argument: Par. 304.3 violates the Fifth Restrictive Rule (Par. 19),
which precludes the General Conference from changing the General Rules
(Par. 103), by (1) “adding a rule of conduct that is not even suggested
anywhere in the General Rules,” and (2) “causing harm to persons who are
a part of the covenant community and The United Methodist Church
itself.”
The Committee does not agree
that ¶ 304.3 constitutes a revocation or change of the General Rules. 13
WAS:112156.2
14
WAS:112156.2
B. Argument: Punishing Pastor Stroud on the basis of “her homosexual
status and her monogamous committed relationship with her partner”
discriminates on the basis of “status” in violation of Pars. 4 and 15 of
the Constitution.
Pursuant to Decision No. 702,
the Committee cannot resolve this question because neither the General
Conference nor the Annual Conference has defined the key terms and the
Committee is precluded by the Judicial Council from supplying its own
interpretation of those terms. However, as we hold above, Appellant
cannot be denied an appointment in a manner that satisfies due process
in the absence of such definitions by the Annual Conference or the
General Conference.
C.
Argument:
Par. 304.3 violates Article XXI of the Articles of Religion (Par. 103)
by effectively requiring homosexuals to “vow the estate of single life.”
The Committee concludes that
Paragraph 304.3 does not violate Article XXI. That Article, by its
terms, is designed to protect the right of clergy to marry, a right
which is not infringed by sanctioning sexual activity outside the
context of marriage.
D. The
Presiding Officer Erred By Instructing the Trial Court, During the
Penalty Phase, That “a Bishop May Not Appoint One Who Has Been Found By
The Trial Court To Be a Self-Avowed Practicing Homosexual.”
Since the Committee’s holding
vitiates the verdict and (with it) the penalty, the Committee need not
resolve the question of whether there was error in connection with the
instructions given to the Trial Court during the penalty phase.
DECISION
The verdict and the penalty are
reversed and set aside. Although the Committee believes that the
evidence in support of the charge was overwhelming and would be
sustained in the absence of legal error, the Committee concludes that
legal error vitiates the verdict on two independent grounds. First,
Judicial Council Decision No. 702, which binds this Committee, makes it
legal error—namely, a deprivation of due process—to try, convict and
deprive a member in full connection of her right to an appointment
pursuant to ¶¶ 304.3 and 2702.1(b) of the
Discipline
when, as in this case, neither
the General Conference nor the pertinent Annual Conference has defined
the words “practicing homosexual” and “status.” Second, it was error to
try and convict the Appellant on the basis of ¶ 304.3 because that
provision constitutes a “new standard or rule of doctrine” which has not
been declared by he General Conference to be “‘not contrary to’ the
present standards,” in violation of the First Restrictive Rule and ¶ 102
of the
Discipline.
Friday, April 29, 2005 William “Scott” Campbell, Julius A. Archibald,
Jr., Sharon L. Bassett, Dale W. Dobbs, N. Sharon Leatherman, Ronald M.
McCauley, John L. Topolewski, Joy P. Wilcox
UMNS Additional Information
For
background on the case, go to Appeal
begins for former clergywoman who lost credentials.
***********************************************************
New PRESS ARTICLES since last
NIC VOICE
News Update:
The following has been posted in numerous news sources on-line:
Methodist Church to reinstate lesbian minister
MSNBC -
A church panel voted 8 to 1 to set aside an earlier decision to
defrock Irene “Beth”
Stroud for violating the
church’s ban on openly gay clergy.
...
***********************************************************
Pre-Trial Articles/News not included in previous
NIC VOICE
Updates:
Defrocked lesbian pastor appeals church's decision
Washington
Times - Washington,DC,USA
Printer Friendly URL:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StoryID=20050428-115520-4626r
The Washington Times
www.washingtontimes.com
THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Published April 29,
2005
BALTIMORE -- Irene Elizabeth "Beth" Stroud, a Methodist associate pastor
who was removed from her pulpit four months ago for lesbianism, begged a
church appeals court yesterday to overturn the decision that resulted in
her defrocking.
"I pray the church will do justice in my case," she said. "Gay and
lesbian people and their families and people who love them are really
prevented by discrimination from receiving the love of Christ as we
understand it."
Read
More
Defrocked
Lesbian
Methodist Files Appeal to Church Court
Christian Post - San Francisco,CA,USA
A
lesbian woman who was stripped of her ministerial credentials by the
United Methodist Church five months ago appealed to regain her post
Friday,
Apr. 29, 2005 Posted: 7:35:36AM EST
<snip>
After the hearing, Stroud said she was “impressed” by the committee on
appeals.
"I was very impressed with the Committee on Appeals. They were very
astute and they just showed an enormous understanding of church law and
the issues involved,” said Stroud.
Stroud, who currently serves as a lay leader to the First United
Methodist Church in Germantown, said she will not begin ministering as a
pastor until the entire appeals process is played out and unless she
succeeds.
According to the Rev. William Scott Campbell, chairman of the appeals
panel, he said to AP that one of several things could happen after the
decision is announced. Either side could appeal to a Methodist supreme
court or the case could be remanded for a second trial. The appeals
panel could also reverse the earlier verdict, change the penalty, or do
both.
Read More
*****************************************
News Updates Previously Released by
NIC VOICE
Regarding Beth Stroud Trial:
Pre-Trial Updates (posted at the NIC VOICE Forum at Faithful
Christian Laity)
Collection of Trial and Appeal Press Reports at Beth Stroud’s Web Site
*****************************************
